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Criminal responsibility is founded on the volitional control of action, yet many offences are 
committed whilst intoxicated. Alcohol is a widely-used intoxicant known to impair behavioural control and 
memory, opening the door to claims of partial or absent responsibility. Criminal law rules have developed 
to resist such claims. In particular, findings of criminal responsibility in intoxicated offenders frequently call 
on ‘prior fault’ logic: the intoxicated offender may claim to have been irrational, but culpability can be 
imported from their earlier, rational choice to consume intoxicants (Robinson, 1985). That drunkenness 
does not excuse derives from an unforced choice to become drunk. Yet this raises questions over the 
extent to which an alcoholic’s choice to drink is unforced. Current neurobiological models of addiction 
stress compulsion as a primary component, bringing into question the volitional nature of continued 
consumption (Volkow & Fowler, 2000; Dalley, Everitt, & Robbins, 2011). At the same time, some legal 
scholars have noted that the potentially fatal nature of alcoholic withdrawal could likewise undermine 
suggestion that consumption is voluntary, drawing analogy to a defence of duress where actions have 
been forced under the threat of death (Husak, 1999; Yaffe, 2013). We asked 290 UK Magistrates to 
consider a criminal sentencing scenario in which evidence of a defendant’s state of intoxication at the 
time of the offence was presented in tandem with information that they were either teetotal, a casual 
drinker or an alcoholic. We found that intoxication reduced blameworthiness for criminal acts if the 
offender had no previous experience with alcohol whilst, in direct contrast, intoxication served to 
aggravate offending if the defendant was an alcoholic. The likelihood of our defendant receiving a 
reduced sentence was over ten times greater in the event that, though intoxicated, they were not also an 
alcoholic. Leniency was blocked by alcoholism despite Magistrates’ qualitative responses suggesting its 
understanding as a generally mitigating factor, revealing a disconnect between expressed opinion and 
sentencing behaviour in practice. Our results indicate that, far from excusing drunkenness, the state of 
being an alcoholic is more frequently deemed to aggravate offending, being associated with harsher 
sentencing even where the offence in question was committed whilst sober. 
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